Air France 447 and the lessons for SAA!

The Shock Discovery

Earlier this year (2013) it was revealed that South African Airways had taken a decision not to employ white pilots.

It is my understanding that the same decision was taken in regard to its technicians.

 

The Explanation

SAA spokesperson Kabelo Ledwaba apparently told Beeld Newspaper the move was intended to bring pilot demographics in line with that of the country. He told Rapport that 85% of SAA's pilots were white, and, of these, 91% were men.

It should be stated that the white people constitute less than 10% of the total population of South Africa. At the outset, I should say that I find this figure to be a disgrace. However, addressing this the problem requires understanding about how this situation arose in the first place.

Historical Context - Apartheid

The discrimination suffered by the majority of South Africans during apartheid is well-documented.  One of the consequences of the policy of apartheid is that the majority of South Africans were denied the opportunity to compete for jobs on an equal footing. Another aim and consequence of apartheid was that whites received a first world education whilst blacks were exposed to an inferior system of so-called Bantu education which was intended to further impede their ability to compete with whites on an equal footing in the job market.

The injustice of this policy and the inequity which resulted from it cannot be denied nor defended.

Historical Context – Political Transformation

When democracy arrived in South Africa in 1994 it brought an end to the disenfranchisement of the black majority. Despite having no political power, whites still retained economic power, which together with the benefits of a first world education, gave them an unfair advantage in the job markets and in the economy as a whole.

The elimination of economic inequity was never going to be easy. The government, however, sought to level the playing fields by introducing a policy of affirmative action, also known as Black Economic Empowerment or BEE. Despite criticism that these policies were simply apartheid in reverse, the intention was to give the majority of South Africans a fairer economic stake in their own country. 

Historical Context - Economic Transformation

There are many South Africans from all sides of the political spectrum who believe that despite having been in power for twenty years, the ANC have not made serious inroads into the problem of black poverty and inequity in South Africa. They argue that the government’s BEE policies have simply brought about small black elite who now share the economic pie with the white minority whilst the majority have to content themselves with the crumbs. The recent booing of President Zuma at Nelson Mandela’s memorial service is a manifestation of this growing frustration.

Those defending the government would argue that BEE and Affirmative Action have brought about a growing black middle class and that such policies have provided many blacks people with job opportunities which they might otherwise not have had. I do not propose to enter this debate on either side.

Historical Context – Post 1994 Education

Whilst the government’s record on economic empowerment is debateable, the same cannot be said about its record in education.

No one denies the enormity of task faced by the government in 1994 as it tried to replace Bantu education with a system on a par with the former white schools.  Existing economic disparities only added to this immense challenge. Hungry children aren’t able to concentrate for long. Children from poorer homes are often compelled to leave school at a young age to start working to assist  the family to make ends meet.

In addition, finding sufficient black teachers who could not only speak indigenous languages, but who were also able to speak good English and teach in English was also never going to be easy at first. There can be little doubt that, even after 1994, most black school children at formerly black schools were being taught by teachers who were themselves products of Bantu education, and were going to homes where their parents, also mostly products of Bantu education, could provide little assistance with homework. I won’t even speak of those parents who were forced to work long hours in poorly paid jobs and would therefore not have been around at home for long enough to provide meaningful assistance with homework even if they were able to do so.

Bear in mind that English is a foreign language to a large percentage of black South Africans and many only encounter it for the first time in their first year of school if not later.

White South African children, however, have always had the benefit of English as their home or second language. And since many white parents are also English speaking or had at least passed it at Matric at school, most are able to assist their children with homework if needed. In addition, post 1994, most white school children continued to attend the so-called, Model C schools which were formerly mostly whites only institutions. Unsurprisingly, the best teachers of Maths and English, and in particular those who spoke English correctly were almost all employed by Model C schools.

Nobody can doubt the advantage which white children enjoyed by growing up with English and having access to many of the best teachers at model C schools.  By the same token, no-one can doubt the disadvantage suffered by many black children for the reasons already discussed above.  
These disparities are cultural and historical.  They are the result of Apartheid and Bantu Education.  I am not for one minute suggesting that white children are in any way different to or superior to their fellow South Africans. They are not.

In fact, there are some black children who have attended non-model C schools who have managed to shine despite their circumstances.

One positive aspect of post-1994 change is that the former exclusively white model C schools were converted into non-racial schools. The first step to free the black children of South Africa from the curse of Bantu education had begun.

There is no doubt that the school results of those black children who attended the former Model C schools improved dramatically. That said, the government’s failure to adequately address the plight of the non-Model C schools throughout the country is widely accepted. The prevailing view is that, whilst the challenges were enormous for many of the reasons set-out above, far more could have been done in the twenty years since 1994 to wipe out most of the legacy of Bantu Education. This has not occurred.

Many black school children never finish school. It is estimated that around half of all black school children do not leave school with any level of English or Mathematics which would enable them to continue to study at any tertiary education institution without at least completing some bridging course. The level of education in basic mathematics of South Africa’s children has been rated as being the third lowest in the world.

Yet the government spent billions on an arms deal. For a country not at war, and with no enemies, the failure to spend this money on education is, like Apartheid and Bantu education, also a crime against humanity. I make no apologies for making this statement. So too, is the twenty billion rands or so wasted by corrupt and inept government officials in this country for the past few years. (These are figures are provided by the South African government.) 

Level of education required by pilots / Addressing the disparity

By now the reader will understand the historical context which led to the situation where 85% of the pilots at SAA are white despite whites comprising fewer than 10% of the population. 

 In addition, it does not require much intelligence to realise that any policy to address this inequitable disparity has to take the continued reality of the racial disparity in South African education into account.

Commercial pilots require an above average proficiency in English and mathematics in order to master subjects such as aerodynamics, meteorology, navigation, ATC, Aviation law, and instrumentation.

Any failure to master or understand any of these subjects could prove fatal. I will provide examples herein below. Certainly, matric graduates who are only able to pass standard grade English or mathematics with just over 30% are not likely to make a success of a career in aviation without some intervention to eliminate the educational disparity which exists in the country. 

For historical reasons, it is arguable that at least half of this country’s population does not have the requisite proficiency in English or mathematics required in order to master the highly technical material required by pilots.

Until this situation changes, SAA cannot expect to have pilot demographics which are anywhere near in line with that of the country. Any CEO who even mentions commercial pilot numbers at SAA being brought into line with national demographics at SAA at this time has no concept of airline safety and is, quite obviously, a danger to society.

It bears mentioning that South Africa’s pilots are largely regarded as being amongst the best in the world and despite the Helderberg air crash in the eighties, SAA is still one of the safest airlines around. I have often flown with Emirates and many is the South African accent which greets the passengers from the flight deck.

Given that a single air crash is enough to destroy a healthy airline, one would think, that the CEO would, instead of moaning about a disparity he cannot do much about now, he would instead be grateful for the expertise which the white pilots bring to SAA.

They not only ensure the day to day safety of all SAA passengers, that of the people who live near the airports and under the SAA flight paths, but also the safety and the job security of SAA cabin crew (now mostly black), the job security of other SAA staff, now mostly black, and even the job security of the SAA Board, now mostly black, but one must also consider all the families who depend on the latter for their existence.  For now, it is the pilots (mostly white) and the technicians (probably still mostly white) who keep the airline flying safely.

 

SAA finances have not been healthy for several years. I leave the reader to find out the full and very sorry tale of SAA’s mismanagement for him or herself. Suffice it to say, one air crash and can bring down an airline and end it for everyone.
 

By saying what I do above, I do not dispute that the racial make-up of pilots at SAA is a national disgrace.  However, several important points do not appear to have been considered by SAA.

 Firstly, given our history, the present compliment of SAA pilots are likely to be the very best SAA were able to hire since 1994.

From an aviation safety point of view, that is excellent news, particularly for SAA passengers, staff, cabin crew, and South Africans on the ground, not to mention foreign tourists. All of these people are entitled to nothing but the very best pilots. Instead of complaining about the present situation, the present CEO should be doing what he can to ensure a continuation of the present standards. Sometimes, a bad thing has a good compensating advantage. Our present SAA pilots are just that!

Secondly, the SAA Board needs to realise that the present racial disparity amongst pilot numbers is a symptom not a cause in itself. It cannot be fixed by SAA overnight.

If anybody has to take drastic steps to remedy this situation, it is the government. It needs to eliminate all inequality in education so that more of the very best young black candidate pilots this country can produce can compete on an equal footing with the very best white pilots this country.

Thirdly, until the government does change the fact of educational inequality in South Africa, any talk of the airline reflecting population demographics any time soon is pointless and, frankly dangerous.


Imagine if someone hired musicians in an orchestra by insisting on compliance with racial and gender quotas reflecting a country's demographics instead of simply choosing the best musician available for each instrument. In some things, quotas cannot work and excellence is not negotiable.

Fourthly, the model C schools have been producing high calibre black graduates for several years now. The best of these should already now be able to compete with the best available white candidates on an equal and non-discriminatory footing. The change will be painfully slow at first, but at least the SAA Board members will be able to look everyone in the eye and honestly say that they have hired only the best pilots available.

SAA must pursue a safety first policy in recruitment of pilots and technicians. Rather be safe than sorry. Irrespective of one’s race, if the pilot announces an emergency return to the airport whilst the aircraft starts to shake and rattle, black and white passengers alike will be praying to the good Lord asking for one and only one thing, that the pilot knows EXACTLY what he is doing and that he is excellent enough to bring everyone safely back to their loved ones.

Fifthly, the other advantage of the expertise held by the present, mostly white SAA pilots, is that when the best black candidates start making it through to the cockpit on merit, which should be happening already, they will be able to benefit from the expertise of the best of the best pilots. Learning from anyone but the best only sets up possible bad habits which could come back to bite one in the posterior down the line.

The concept of trying to hire pilots to reflect the racial make-up of the country is inherently flawed.  If any of the best candidates available in one particular year are passed over on racial grounds, it means that at least some of the people hired to replace them cannot be the best available. Instead, they will be second best. Second best in aviation is never acceptable as I will demonstrate below.

Sixthly, the numbers of suitable white pilots are likely to be far higher than their pro rata percentage of the population for some time yet. Why should they have to find work in another country? Why should another airline benefit from having some of the best pilots this country can produce? Why should South Africans not be entitled to the very best pilots SAA can possibly hire? The people of this country have suffered enough discrimination in the past. It is time for them to have the best. They are entitled to it. Those who visit this country from abroad are also entitled to our best efforts to ensure their safety and nothing less. 

We should bear in mind that the main way tourists come to SA is by air. If SAA suffers an airliner crash, the airline itself will in all probability fold, and our tourist industry will also suffer irreparable harm. Even if it does not crash, the taxpayers of this country will bear the brunt of the cost. That cost will include a likely boycott by local and foreign passengers who will fear SAA’s commitment to their safety.

Already, some African airlines cannot land in Europe and America. Africa’s aviation safety record is the worst in the world. We in this country do not fall into that category yet. Why can’t we keep it like that?

Excluding the one population group which arguably produces at least some of the best exam results in English and Mathematics makes no sense at all and is totally unjustifiable.

Could you imagine an airline like Emirates trying to hire pilots by having regard to the local racial and gender make-up or to the religions of the local population of the United Arab Emirates? 


Emirates  wouldn’t dream of departing from the policy of hiring the best of the best. If they did, they would quickly lose market share to other airlines who do put safety first.


It seems surprising that SAA seem to believe that international norms will not apply to them despite that they operate internationally.  

Seventhly, no airline can operate without aviation insurance.  Airliners cost several hundred million dollars, and an air crash caused by deliberate SAA negligence will include damages which have to be added to that replacement cost.


SAA’s insurance is based on the assessed risks of an insured event, such as an air crash, occurring. The insurers are entitled to expect and to require that SAA only hire the very best technicians and pilots available. They aren't interested in hearing about racial and gender quotas. insurer.

One thing is certain, if the insurer ends up being able to prove that SAA were using race or gender as a criterion for recruitment of pilots instead of excellence, they will not hesitate to repudiate SAA’s claims for recoupment of the losses and the damages arising from an air crash.

Eighthly, if SAA’s insurers may well be entitled to cancel the agreement of insurance with SAA (with damages) alternatively, the insurers advise that they immediately wish to re-assess the increased risk posed by SAA's failure to hire only the best available pilots and technicians. Even if this risk is assessed at only 10% higher it is now, that is 10% too high as far as most passengers are concerned.

And a 10% higher risk means a far higher premium which other, more sensible, more competitive and better managed airlines would not have to pay. This alone could cause the end of an already less than well managed airline. SAA is already struggling to keep up with its competitors. Higher premiums could be the straw which breaks the camel's back.

Ninthly, after SAA’s awful malfeasance on its web site, the luminaries in control then tried to suggest that they had addressed the situation by referring to the white women they were now hiring as part of their gender quota. They do walk into these things, don't they?


In my day, whenever an aircraft flew past, most of the boys looked up in wonder and most of the girls carried on with whatever they were doing. I accept that times have changed but I doubt that the number of women interested in becoming airline pilots has increased dramatically.


Accordingly SAA’s attempt to escape from its blatant racism by hiding behind the skirts of white female pilots does nothing to calm anyone's fears about safety. In any event, I won’t fly on an airline that won’t test the best female pilots, of any race, against the best male pilots, of any race available to determine who the best ones are. If the women come out tops, and are hired, then good for them, and I’ll happily fly with them.

Finally, SAA never learned anything from the continued speculation about the cause of the Helderberg crash. The previous racist regime was suspected of illegally conveying highly flammable material on board in the cargo hold. The speculation of the cause of that accident rages on today.

If there is another SAA crash now, and if a black pilot happens to be on board, you can just imagine how his mere presence in the cockpit will be linked to SAA’s racist recruitment policies. This is likely to be the case even if the black pilot is in fact the best of the best of his intake and even if he had nothing to do with the accident.


Any attempts to clear the black pilot will be lost amidst the furore which will arise when the risks posed by race based recruitment of pilots and technicians moves to the top of the list of the most likely causes. Any attempt to exonerate the black pilot will simply be seen as a cover-up. SAA will collapse and the cause of brilliant black pilots will not be advanced.

SAA should not be afraid to announce that whilst they are an equal opportunities employer, when it comes to safety, they are unapologetically elitist and they hire only the best.

The root causes of airline crashes

 Air crashes do not just happen. They are mainly caused by technical failures or errors, pilot error, weather, errors by Air Traffic Control, and often by an unfortunate combination of one or more such events. In cases where more than one contributing factor brings down an airliner, it is often so that the absence of any one of those factors would, on another given day, have been enough to save the aircraft.

The margin between total disaster and a manageable incident is often a fine one. It follows that where the margin for error is so small, no airline in the world can afford to have anyone but the very best available pilots and technicians on their payroll.

By the same token, failing to hire anyone but the very best pilots and technicians amounts to criminal negligence. If the Board of SAA disagree, let them sue me in Court to interdict this article. Airline safety is no laughing matter. No-one has the right to gamble with the lives of airline passengers. Those who do should be prepared to suffer the consequences.

The need for an excellent grasp of mathematics, the role of automation & the reasons for improved airliner safety

Some aviation commentators maintain that increased aviation automation and safety has reduced the chances of an air crash to such an extent that airlines can now get away with hiring less experienced pilots.

I concede that aviation automation has indeed reduced the workload of pilots and that they are sometimes regarded more as computer operators or systems' managers than the pilots of say, fifty years ago.

Dealing with the second issue first, improved technology has indeed made airliners safer than ever before. But this is also in part attributable to the fact that most airlines hire only the best pilots and technicians, and they also ensure that their aircraft are properly maintained and that their pilots are continually subjected to evaluation and in-house training on flight simulators.

Increased cockpit automation is also something of a mixed blessing.  In the first place, pilot reliance on such automation runs the risk of reduced pilot capability and readiness when such systems fail.

But the biggest problem arises when these systems fail. And believe me, they do fail. When technical failures occur in an automated cockpit, these have often proved difficult to diagnose speedily and this has had fatal consequences.

Automated cockpits and on-board flight computers have also taken over many of the pilot’s functions which required a thorough knowledge of mathematics. Calculation of fuel consumption en-route, en-route navigation, the calculation of the correct rotation speed on take-off etc. can all be performed by an on-board or hand-held flight computer.

However, the recent Hudson Air Crash (US Airways Flight 1549) is one of many air crashes which reveal that pilots still need their mathematical skills when their on-board systems fail. In an emergency such as that, there is often no time to reach around for and fiddle about on hand held devices.

It will be re-called that the airliner took off from La Guardia airport in New York and shortly afterwards it struck a flock of geese which immediately caused both engines to fail. An all engine flame-out is very uncommon, but I can recount four other incidents which are well-known. One, off the Seychelles coast, had a fatality rate of 50%. The plane broke up on impact with the sea.

When all engines fail, it is not long before many of the instruments and systems in the cockpit fail due to a lack of power. When a flame out occurs, a small propeller/generator drops out of the bottom of the fuselage and this provides a modicum of power for basic flight control, radio and one or two other systems.

As soon as an airliner loses power, the pilots have to take immediate steps to employ the remaining altitude to best effect in order to reach the nearest airfield or to find the safest place to put the aircraft down i.e. to land or to crash land. When an emergency such as this occurs shortly after take-off, the problem is that there is virtually no altitude to play with.

With all engines out, the aircraft effectively becomes a massive glider. Each aircraft has an optimal engine out gliding speed. By using pitch to maintain the indicated best gliding speed, one can get the most distance out of the remaining altitude. Determining the range of the aircraft needs to be done instantly and accurately. At the same time, one needs to communicate with air traffic control who will try to provide distances to the nearest available airfields. Reaching for pocket calculators or IPad is almost impossible. But even if one of the two pilots could reach for such a device, he would be required to instinctively know whether to divide altitude by rate of descent or the other way around.  Getting it wrong under pressure is easy, and even with a calculator errors could be fatal.

Captain Sullenberger was able to perform the requisite calculations in his head while flying the aircraft and communication with air traffic control and he lost no time in determining that their altitude was insufficient to reach any airport on offer by ATC. This was a mathematical exercise performed perfectly and repeatedly under pressure as he eliminated the those options.

Thanks to these calculations, he had enough time on hand to realise that they were going to have to aim for the Hudson and he was able to use the remaining altitude to perform what many called the miracle on the Hudson. The fact is that what he did was mathematical, and the rest was down to training and experience. Sullenberger was also one of United’s best pilots and in fact, he was apparently also one of United’s flight instructors.  If the second best guy had been there on the day, the plane could have broken up on landing and many could have died.

I should also mention that the Captain’s use of ATC was superb. He spoke in short eloquent sentences and this ensured quick, efficient communication of information to ATC.

On the subject of maths again, there was a similar incident where a gallons /litre misunderstanding caused an airliner to run out of fuel in mid-air somewhere over Canada. Despite that the aircraft was at cruise altitude when this occurred, the pilots soon determined that their original calculations were out and they decided they could not make the airport ATC were directing them to. At some point they decided to head for an old abandoned airport, Gimley, which the Captain, or the co-pilot knew from earlier air force experience. (Again experience saves the day.)

On final approach they realised that they would arrive too high and this would cause them to overshoot the runway without having enough altitude to turn around. (Maths again.) To remedy this the Captain tried to bleed-off extra altitude by performing a series of turns. When this failed he resorted to his glider experience (again …..that experience thing) and he performed a dangerous cross-control movement which caused the aircraft to side slip. The aircraft bordered on stalling and falling out of the sky during this highly risky but necessary manoeuvre.

At the last moment he pulled out of that configuration, dropped the landing gear and he safely landed the aircraft. I left out the bit that the runway was being used for drag racing by a large crowd at the time. Nobody on the aircraft or on the ground died. Again, the Captain was the best guy for the job. Like with the Hudson air crash, if anyone less than the very best had been in the cockpit, that day could have been a catastrophic one.

This demonstrates not only the need for maths, but the importance of having superb skill and airmanship, not to mention the ability to perform superbly under pressure. All this was necessary because the automated system was unable to function. I will deal with another air crash where automation failed below.

The Air France Flight 447 Air Crash

This accident is arguably one of the worst airline crashes in the history of aviation. To make it worse, it occurred in an Airbus A330, a very safe aircraft and one which is highly automated.

In addition, to the best of my knowledge, Air France presumably only hires the best available pilots. Firstly, Air France can afford to do so, being one of the largest airlines in the world.


Secondly, Air France is a major client of Airbus, which is a largely French-based manufacturer. When a particular aircraft manufacturer suffers the loss of one of its planes due to an air crash, the knock on effects on sales can sometimes be disastrous. This is especially so if the air crash remains unexplained for a prolonged period while air crash investigators are trying to find the cockpit voice recorders or are trying to finalise their investigations. Such is the fierce competition between Boeing and Airbus.

The astute reader will again notice that a single air crash can be the first nail in the coffin of an entire airline manufacturing company. E.g. McDonnell Douglas. 

The consequences of a single air crash can continue to be felt for years and the number of lives wrecked in the process, and the financial costs can be incalculable.


Considered against the consequences of an airliner crash, a lily white pilot complement, although a disgrace, is really quite insignificant in the greater scheme of things.

 Airbus would be unlikely to stand by idly if they were to discover that Air France had failed to recruit only the best pilots. Airbus would no doubt bring maximum pressure to bear on the airline to desist from doing so at once.  …For France, For Air France, and for Airbus!

Most experts agree that this aircraft, which was flying at night from Brazil to Paris was perfectly capable of flying when it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean somewhere between Brazil and North Africa.

A speed sensor on board, called a pitot tube, appears to have failed, which typically causes problems with the altimeter and the airspeed indicator. In addition conflicting alarms often sound There are several other typical consequences:

1.    The autopilot can disengage. If a pitot tube problem is suspected, a good pilot will disengage the autopilot himself in any event.

2.    An autopilot can only function if the systems or instruments it relies upon are working.

3.    When an emergency occurs in the cockpit, disengaging the autopilot is often wise. During the resulting attempt by the pilot to attempt to fly straight and level, if appropriate, he can ascertain which system, if any, is preventing him from doing so, and diagnosis of the likely problem becomes a lot easier.

4.    Again, this demonstrates the need for an excellent pilot whose flying skills, experience and knowledge are not only required to correctly diagnose the problem, but also to decide what steps need to be taken to deal with it. Again, the best pilots will save the plane, the second best will panic, become distracted, forget to disengage the auto pilot, forget to fly the aircraft, often resulting in a fatal air crash. I kid you not!

5.    The airspeed indicator cannot be relied on to give the accurate air speed readings.

6.    The altimeter cannot be relied upon to correctly provide the correct altitude.

7.    Worse still, at high altitude, the air is so thin that the difference between overspeed (the speed at which the aircraft is flying faster than the airframe permits, which can cause the aircraft to start breaking up) and stall speed (the speed at which the aircraft is flying too slowly and risks falling out of the sky) is far narrower than usual. My reason for pointing this out appears from the next paragraph.

8.    In modern airliners, when a pitot tube fails, if often causes a predictable series of conflicting alarms. The overspeed alarm is one of them. When this occurs at night, and the pilot suspects that his altitude and his airspeed readings are faulty, the typical response is to reduce thrust, and even to raise the nose slightly in order to reduce airspeed.  

9.    This causes the aircraft to lose airspeed and together with the raised nose, the aircraft’s stall warning goes off. This is soon followed by the stick shaker, a final warning stall warning which causes the pilot’s control column to vibrate.

10.Now, faced with conflicting alarms, each warning of  imminent catastrophe, but each also requiring precisely the opposite response, plus the lack of visibility and visual references at night, not to mention faulty airspeed and altitude readings, pilots who are unfamiliar with this type of emergency can easily panic, make the wrong decision, or they can become overwhelmed by the conflicting data to the extent where they often fail to act at all before it is far too late to save the aircraft.

11.In Flight 447, it seems that the pilot chose to raise the nose again to avoid overspeed, and given the reduced power setting, this eventually caused the stick shaker to vibrate again. Despite this, the pilot continued to raise the nose and the aircraft eventually stalled and fell from the sky.

12.All the while, as they fell out of the sky from around 36 000 feet, the pilots were oblivious to the fact that the airliner had stalled.

13.It seems they only realised what had happened some three seconds before the aircraft crashed into the sea, in a belly flop style i.e. not pointing upwards or downwards.

14.I only pray that none of the passengers chanced to look out of the window and was possibly able to see what was about to happen. The thought of anyone having to witness his doom in that manner makes me ill.

15. I agree with the views of most experts who say that the aircraft’s engines were all fully functional at the time of the crash and all the aircraft’s control surfaces were in proper working order. Nothing prevented the pilots from flying the aircraft normally prior to the stall or from implementing stall recovery.

16.In defence of the pilots, had these alarms occurred during the day, and in good visibility, the pilot in control would probably have reacted quite differently.

17.He would have been able to estimate the aircraft’s approximate altitude by visual reference to the sea below and he would simply have to check the cruise thrust setting against the usual N1 thrust for the estimated altitude while trying to maintain straight and level flight.

18.Using the horizon he would be able to prevent an unnecessarily high nose up attitude which would have precluded the stall. This would have allowed him time to find his bearings. It would have quickly dawned on him that, of the two conflicting alarms he had experienced, the one to watch for, and to react to was the stall warning, (the working alarm) and not the overspeed alarm or the rudder ratio alarm (the two false alarms).

19.This accident demonstrates how a series of events can combine to cause an air crash.

20.Firstly, there is a bad thunder storm which the pilots can’t avoid. It occurs at night during severe turbulence. (weather). This apparently caused a possibly less than well designed pitot tube (which if I recall correctly was due for replacement) to ice up. (weather / technical)

21.This in turn caused some instruments to fail and the autopilot to disengage (automated cockpit failure) and finally, the pilots panicked and failed to recognise or to prevent a stall.   (Catestrophic pilot error.)

22.Alternatively stated, they failed to initiate one of the most basic of flight procedures, stall recovery, and instead of flying a perfectly flyable aircraft, they became mesmerised by the failed automated systems.

23.If your relative was on board this aircraft, this event would be enough to make one’s blood boil.

24.A French investigation into the crash concluded that any other crew would probably have reacted similarly.

25.I strongly  disagree with this finding.

26.During or about 2001 I purchased a book on air crashes to increase my knowledge of flying airliners on Microsoft’s Flight Simulator computer programme. Studying air crashes is a superb way to learn what to do, and what not to do.

27.I came across a cockpit voice transcript of an Aero Peru Boeing 757 airliner which crashed into the Pacific Ocean on a thoroughly dark night. It seems that someone covered the aircraft’s pitot tubes with see-through tape prior to washing the aircraft instead of using the usual red tape or red covers which would either have been removed by ground staff or would have been spotted by the pilot doing his external pre-flight inspection. (Ground staff error. Could it happen at Oliver Tambo? Of course it could.)

28.During the take-off roll, the first warning that something was wrong was when, when the pilot and co-pilot noticed that their airspeed readings did not match as is required. The captain assumed that this was not serious and instead of aborting the take-off to ascertain the cause of the problem, they elected to take-off. (First pilot error).

29.To be fair to the crew, there are times when slight instrument anomalies do occur and then disappear for the rest of the flight. Aborting a take-off is expensive and it inconveniences the passengers. However, had they aborted the take-off, a cursory inspection of the pitot tubes would have revealed the see-through tape still covering them, and they would have been on their way within half an hour or so. What did their failure to abort cost? Their lives, the lives of everyone on board, and an entire Boeing 757 aircraft.

30.Once off the coast, on a dark night without visual references, the pitot tube problem occurred again, causing a series of conflicting alarms. All the same ones...

31.According to my research, no crew had ever had to deal with such serious, conflicting and persistent alarms in the cockpit before. Again, there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, and had they kept their heads, they could have worked it out and kept the aircraft flying straight and level until, perhaps, another aircraft could have been sent to them. They could have followed it home, relying on that aircraft’s altitude and speed readings for guidance. Or they could have asked ATC for assistance.

32.Sadly, both ATC and the pilots made another frightful error when they asked ATC to tell them how high they were. Here both pilots and ATC forgot a very crucial fact. ATC radar interrogates an on-board transmitter called a transponder which not only squawks an identifying code provided by ATC, but it also provides ATC with the aircraft’s altitude reading. ATC told the pilots that they were at 10 000 feet. This of course corresponded with their aircraft’s altimeter, which of course, was wrong.

33.At one point, the pilots, still believing they were at 10 000 feet and heading back to Lima, suddenly realised that one of their wings was touching water. The few seconds waiting for the aircraft to cartwheel into the dark ocean at night must have been both sickening and terrifying.

34.The bits of tape, miraculously still on the pitot tubes at the bottom of the ocean and the cockpit voice recordings enabled air crash investigators to establish the cause of the accident. The tapes enabled the investigators to experience the horror and confusion of the crew in the cockpit as various alarms continued to sound.

35.Nobody blames this crew for their failure to recover a perfectly flyable aircraft at night. Other crews faced with this scenario in flight simulator tests mostly did the same thing.

36.As I read the transcript, and for what it is worth, I realised that I would certainly have fared no better than the Aero Peru crew.

37.This accident left an indelible impression on me, however. I saw a similar accident on an air crash investigation programme two years or so later, (an insect had apparently laid eggs in an uncovered pitot tube on a Caribbean Island. I could not stop myself from wanting to shout at the television to warn the crew. Sadly neither pilot had bothered to learn anything from the Aero Peru crash.

38. Had I been a guest in the Air France airliner’s cockpit on that night, I believe I could have helped to prevent that Air Crash by linking it to the Aero Peru crash.

40.That would have enough, and the pilot would have realised that he cannot permit a stall.  

41.Well I wasn’t there. But I am here in South Africa now. All that is needed for evil to prevail is for good men to sit about doing nothing. I cannot remain silent in the face of SAA’s decision to gamble with flight safety.

42.Chillingly, the French report into this accident comes to its erroneous conclusion despite the above two prior fatal air crashes where similar problems confronted the crew. In the light of what pilots and airlines should have learned from that accident, the French report cannot stand.

43. If that is not enough, the report goes on to make an inexplicable concession that several other pilots have encountered this issue on twelve other occasions, and they all made it home safely.

44.  Any passionate airlne pilot, flight sim, or real world, has to study and understand prior crashes. It could save your life and the lives of all on board. Also, airline pilots are subject to regular evaluations in airline flight simulators. Here instructors can set emergencies which cannot be risked in a real world aircraft. Studying air crashes to prepare is like studying past papers for an upcoming exam.

In my view, the Air France pilot in control was negligent in failing to prepare himself for the events which occurred on the A330 that evening.

Air France also have to explain why their instructors permitted pilots to fly without testing to see whether they could deal with incidents like the Aero Peru air crash. 


 If I were the instructor doing the flight-sim training for Air France pilot assessments, the Aero Peru accident would arguably be the first on my list of flight-sim emergency scenarios. This is precisely because of the confusion this type of failure can cause.

On the take-off roll, I would wait for the pilots to spot the altimeter discrepancies. If they did, and irrespective of whether they aborted or not, I would pause the simulation to ask the crew what accident this is based on and what events are likely to occur next. If they failed to answer either question correctly, I would tell them to get out of the simulator, to go away and find out and not to return until they do.

49.Air France ought never to have allowed any pilot to fly a real airliner without such pilot being able to recognise and deal with a pitot tube failure at low and high altitude. Had they done so, I am convinced the pilots would have reacted calmly and would have instinctively coped with the apparent chaos in the cockpit.

Since the Air France report confirms that other pilots, faced with this situation in twelve other incidents, arrived home safely, one imagines that they were either taught to deal with pitot tube failure or they studied it for themselves.


These are the best pilots. Sadly, Air France 447 demonstrates what can occur when the pilot at the helm is obviously qualified, but not the very best at his job. If it could happen to Air France, it could certainly happen to SAA who apparently seek to tempt fate by not only excluding white male pilots, but also apparently white male technicians.


This only adds to the chance of an air crash due in part to technical error and in part to the absence on the day of a pilot with the requisite talent to recognise the problem and to save the day.

SAA cannot afford to turn away any passionate, competent pilot on the grounds of race in case the replacement is another Air France 447 pilot.


This is a safety issue not a race or gender issue.

To avoid air crashes, SAA have to accept applications from each and every qualified pilot who applies. These should be subjected to written tests, oral exams and to extensive simulator tests to test their knowledge and their competency under pressure. Those who get the best marks on all three should be hired, irrespective of race.

 

      ENGLISH

 

Permit me a footnote on the importance of good English. I doubt that I need to elaborate on the level of English required to understand and master the textbooks which commercial pilots are required to master. (Master does not mean pass with 30%)

 

All ATC communication is also in English and the ability to communicate in superb clear English and to understand other English accent is critical generally, and more particularly in an emergency.

 

I close by mentioning an airline accident caused by the inability of both pilots, who happened to be Asian, to understand English properly. An electronic alarm saying ‘Terrain, Terrain,’ started sounding in the cockpit.

 

The last words on the cockpit voice recorder before the airiner crashed into the ground, killing everyone on board, were these:

           

            “What mean terrain?”

 

END